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Abstract
EU policy-makers have focused on the creation of a “Capital Market Union” to
advance the economic vitality of the EU in the aftermath of the Global Financial
Crisis of 2007-09 and the Eurozone crisis of 2011-13. The hope is that EU-wide
capital markets will help remedy the limitations in the EU’s pattern of bank-centered
finance, which, despite the launch of the Banking Union, remains tied to Member
States. Capital market development will provide alternative channels for finance,
which will facilitate greater resiliency, more economic integration within the EU, and
more choices for savers and firms. This chapter uses the origins of the US capital
market union to explore how law can advance the creation of a CMU. The chapter
shows the importance of expanding the focal lens beyond investor protection to
reveal the full array of ways that the legal choices of repression, substitution, and
facilitation shape the private funding of economic activity. Central to the US story
was a mismatch between growing enterprises and a stunted banking system.
Political choices led to a banking system populated primarily by small local banks
that were ill suited to provide financing in the amounts, or with the risk, needed
to fund the railroads and the follow-on industrial film expansion. The bond market
stepped in, creating national and international channels for debt and then equity
finance. Depression-era legal enactments strengthened these markets, through a
strong disclosure regime, a powerful market regulator and enforcer (the SEC), and,
through the separation of commercial and investment banking (“Glass-Steagall”),
the creation of a set of private actors, investment banks, with strong incentives to
develop ever more robust capital markets. These developments also helped deter
states from interfering excessively in the issuance of debt or equity securities, a
core challenge for any capital market union. In arguing for a richer understanding
of “financial structure law,” the chapter makes some EU-specific suggestions.
These focus on facilitating the growth of EU-wide asset managers, which can
engage in credit intermediation similar to banks but with lower systemic risk. In
marshalling individuals’ retirement savings, the asset managers can provide a
funding supply side to CMU.
Keywords: Capital Market Union, banking fragmentation, Glass-Steagall, Blue Sky Laws,
railroad bonds
JEL Classifications: G21, G23, G28, N21, N22
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forthcoming in CAPITAL MARKET UNION AND BEYOND (Franklin Allen et al., eds. (MIT 2018).3
ABSTRACT
EU policy-makers have focused on the creation of a “Capital Market Union” to advance the economic
vitality of the EU in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-09 and the Eurozone crisis of
2011-13. The hope is that EU-wide capital markets will help remedy the limitations in the EU’s pattern
of bank-centered finance, which, despite the launch of the Banking Union, remains tied to Member States.
Capital market development will provide alternative channels for finance, which will facilitate greater
resiliency, more economic integration within the EU, and more choices for savers and firms. This chapter
uses the origins of the US capital market union to explore how law can advance the creation of a
CMU. The chapter shows the importance of expanding the focal lens beyond investor protection to
reveal the full array of ways that the legal choices of repression, substitution, and facilitation shape the
private funding of economic activity.
Central to the US story was a mismatch between growing enterprises and a stunted banking
system. Political choices led to a banking system populated primarily by small local banks that were ill
suited to provide financing in the amounts, or with the risk, needed to fund the railroads and the follow-on
industrial film expansion. The bond market stepped in, creating national and international channels for
debt and then equity finance. Depression-era legal enactments strengthened these markets, through a
strong disclosure regime, a powerful market regulator and enforcer (the SEC), and, through the separation
of commercial and investment banking (“Glass-Steagall”), the creation of a set of private actors,
investment banks, with strong incentives to develop ever more robust capital markets. These
developments also helped deter states from interfering excessively in the issuance of debt or equity
securities, a core challenge for any capital market union.
In arguing for a richer understanding of “financial structure law,” the chapter makes some EU-specific
suggestions. These focus on facilitating the growth of EU-wide asset managers, which can engage in
credit intermediation similar to banks but with lower systemic risk. In marshalling individuals’ retirement
savings, the asset managers can provide a funding supply side to CMU.
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The free flow of capital was one of the fundamental principles on which the EU
was built. Despite the progress that has been made over the past 50 years,
Europe's capital markets are still relatively underdeveloped and fragmented.
EU Commission, 2015 CMU Action Plan
Creation of an EU-wide “Capital Market Union” is one of the institutional efforts to
advance the economic vitality of the EU in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis of 200709 and the Eurozone crisis of 2011-13. The ambition of CMU is to produce greater growth,
greater economic integration across the EU, and greater resiliency within the EU to local
economic shocks. The hope is that EU-wide capital markets will help remedy the limitations in
the EU’s pattern of bank-centered finance. Robust capital markets can enhance resilience by
allowing funding to flow around rather than through damaged bank balance sheets after a
financial shock. This is critical because, despite the launch of the EU’s Banking Union project,
banks remain tied to specific Member States and thus to local central banks and national
governments. A more integrated capital market should also enhance efficiency, providing savers
a wider array of investment opportunities and offering firms greater access to financing. Given
the present Member State-focus of EU banking, cross-border funding will flow more smoothly
through securities market issuances than bank debt financings.
The CMU project has unleashed a large regulatory undertaking steered by the
Directorate-General for Financial Stability, Financial Services, and Capital Markets Union (“DG
FISMA”) with the goal of having the regulatory pieces in place by 2019. The nature of this
undertaking requires asking whether and how law can bring about the desired end of a more
robust and integrated capital market. In the course of writing this chapter, we have come to
believe that the “law and finance” literature, with its focus on “investor protection,” offers too
narrow a frame to understand the interaction between law and the development of a financial
system. Rather, we need a broader understanding of “financial structure law” – the way that the
legal choices of repression, substitution, and facilitation shape the environment for the private
funding of economic activity. Investor protection is surely among the key ingredients for a
thriving CMU but much more is required, an architecture for a particular sort of financial
system.2
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This is similar to the implicit claim in Mark Roe’s work that equity ownership diffusion (and thus
managerial empowerment) in the US followed from politically-inspired repression of financial
2
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Law should have great potency in this undertaking. A financial system is a product of
rules; it is not a “natural” system. As the rules change, the financial system will inevitably
restructure itself. On the other hand, the relationship among law, financial system design, and
financial development is complex and iterative. Law’s greatest impact is often indirect and
context dependent; its repressions can be more important than its explicit permissions. Law
matters, but not necessarily in the ways lawmakers intend.
Forming a “Capital Market Union” is a project of transnational institution-making and
transnational behavioral change. The only way to understand the myriad mechanisms through
which law can help achieve (and try not to hinder) these ambitions is to dig into the details. For
an American observer, there is no better place to start than the world’s largest and most
successful “Capital Market Union,” the capital market of the US. Despite the initial allocation of
power among the several states of the United States, which included jurisdiction over the state’s
banks and the state’s securities markets, the US ended up with a national system of finance, a
Capital Market Union from sea-to-shining-sea.
Central to the story is the mismatch between the growing demand for capital from
increasingly large and risky enterprises in the late 19th and early 20th centuries and banks’ limited
capacity to provide this funding. Rules separating banking from commerce, prohibitions on bank
branching, and the absence of a central bank resulted in a stunted US banking system that lacked
capacity to fund large-scale enterprise.3 The consequence was first, the growth of bond markets
that could access both national and international capital markets, and then second, the growth of
equity markets. The role of law here was largely repressive, facilitating the growth of capital
markets by limiting bank capacity.
But the law also came to play an important role in facilitating the ongoing growth and
vibrancy of these markets. Market-based credit intermediation and public equity markets in the
United States were buttressed by the Depression-era securities laws, which greatly strengthened
the disclosure regime for the public issuance of debt and equity securities. Robust disclosure
reduced the banks’ advantage in credit assessment and monitoring; and, it added depth and
liquidity to equity markets. The federal securities laws also established a single federal securities
regulator, the Securities Exchange Commission, which side-lined potentially inconsistent state
regulatory regimes not so much through straightforward pre-emption but through a broad
mandate to facilitate a national system and a large budget.

intermediaries rather than from the status of investor protection. See Mark Roe, STRONG MANAGERS,
WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994).
3
The claim here is that the demand for capital exceeded banks’ lending capacities. This does not deny
that banks also contributed to industrialization and enterprise growth in the United States during this time,
nor does it ignore the role banks played in facilitating debt financing prior to the Glass-Steagall Act. For
further insight into the role of banks, see Eric Hilt, Banks, Insider Connections, and Industrialization in
New England: Evidence from the Panic of 1873 (working paper, 2018); Howard Bodenhorn, A HISTORY
OF BANKING IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA: FINANCIAL MARKETS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AN
ERA OF NATION-BUILDING (2000); Vincent P. Carosso, THE MORGANS: PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
BANKERS, 1854–1913 (1987); Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Banks, Kinship, and Economic Development: The
New England Case, 46 (3) Journal of Economic History 647 (1986).
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Subsequent legal changes further diminished the advantages that banks often enjoy. The
Trust Indenture Act of 1940 (along with the 1939 Chandler Bankruptcy Act) further reduced the
need for bank monitoring by protecting bondholders from expropriation by insiders in debt
restructurings. The 1940 Investment Company Act provided a regulatory license for the mutual
fund industry, which eventually made large sums available to buy all grades and maturities of
debt issuances, in addition to equities. A new vehicle, the open-ended mutual fund, meant that
retail investors could acquire a share of diversified credit portfolios while retaining liquidity,
reducing yet another advantage of bank-based finance.
Legal developments outside the financial sector also played an important role in the rise
of the US CMU. State mandates to pre-fund pension promises of state and local governments
and a national similar requirement for private employers (through adoption of the Employee
Retirement Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”)) produced vast sums to fund credit issuances
outside of the banking system. The size and sophistication of these pension fund investors also
helped make equity capital a viable source of financing for start-ups and resource-constrained
mid-stream firms.
As even this brief account illustrates, the history of the US CMU is a mixed story for the
capacity of lawmakers to create a CMU. The good news is that law matters. The creation of an
expert regulatory body with the power to enforce the law, help it to evolve, and suppress statebased efforts that might threaten the union, for example, is core. The less-good news is that
motivated private actors are also critical. In the United States, the law helped promote the
growth of powerful investment banks and institutional investors, but these legal interventions
had real costs and were often motivated by distinctly American political concerns.4
This chapter addresses three critical elements of the origins of Capital Market Union in
the US. Part I provides the requisite background, using history and some figures to develop a
stylized account of the difference between capital markets in the US vs. the EU. Part II sketches
the historical basis for the fragmentation of the US banking system and the absence of a central
bank. Part III shows how the advent of the railroads and the greater concentration among US
industrial firms created credit demand that the fragmented banking system could not provide,
especially in the absence of a central bank that could serve as a lender of last resort (“LOLR”).
4

A number of scholars have explored the ways that the limits imposed on banks for much of American
history continue to shape today’s financial and business landscape. Mark Roe, as noted above, shows
how such constraints meant that financial intermediaries could not become powerful corporate
stakeholders, thus clearing the path to dispersed owners and powerful managers. Mark Roe, STRONG
MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994). Our
colleague Charles Calomiris (with co-authors in several papers) has described how banking fragmentation
limited US banks’ financing capacity and the synergies that would derive from an alternative universal
banking model. Charles Calomiris & Carlos Ramirez, The Financing of the American Corporation, 18001990, in THE AMERICAN CORPORATION TODAY, at 126 (Carl Kaysen, ed., 1996); Charles Calomiris, The
Costs of Rejecting Universal Banking: American Finance in the German Mirror, 1870-1914, in THE
COORDINATION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY WITHIN AND BETWEEN FIRMS at 257 (Naomi Lamoreaux &
Daniel Raff, eds., 1995); Charles Calomiris & Daniel Raff, The Evolution of Market Structure,
Information, and Spreads in American Investment Banking, in ANGLO-AMERICAN FINANCE: FINANCIAL
MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONS IN 20TH-CENTURY NORTH AMERICA AND THE U.K., at 103 (Richard Sylla
& Michael Bordo, eds.,1995). Our account builds on these and others to show how repression of the
banking system was an important factor in the growth of capital market alternatives.
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This led to national securities markets, first for bonds and then, as firms merge using stock as
consideration, for equities. Part IV discusses the importance of the Glass-Steagall Act in the rise
of the US CMU. By separating investment banking and commercial banking, Glass-Steagall
created a set of financial firms that had strong incentives to develop securities market-based
alternative to bank-based finance. Part IV also discusses how the creation of the SEC and the
implementation of far-reaching federal securities laws forestalled and pre-empted state-based
securities regulation, which could have resulted in a less unified regime.
Part V reflects on current EU efforts to create a Capital Market Union in light of the US
experience. One challenge for the EU is to find an appropriate pattern of federal regulation over
the EU’s capital market that will facilitate EU-wide issuance of debt and equity securities. A
main source of resistance will be “regulatory embeddedness” among the Member States and the
notable forces of path-dependency, both the short-term efficiency-based as well as the
protectionist rent-based. The US experience suggests this can and must be overcome. An
important opportunity for the EU’s efforts to create a meaningful CMU is to foster the
development of asset managers (which include for these purposes the insurers and the pension
funds), the funding supply side for CMU. Asset managers can screen potential borrowers and
assemble diversified portfolios of credit claims without the help of banks. Moreover, because
they engage in far less liquidity transformation, they are less fragile than banks and could
function as a “spare tire,” helping to provide financing to the real economy when the banking
system breaks down.5 The chapter concludes with specific guidance for ways to promote the
growth of EU asset managers.

Alan Greenspan popularized the notion that robust capital markets can function like a “spare tire” when
a banking system goes into crisis. Alan Greenspan, Do Efficient Financial Markets Mitigate Financial
Crises? Before the Financial Markets Conference of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Sea Island,
Georgia (1999). For evidence regarding the recent crisis, see Ross Levine, Chen Lin & Wensi Xie, Spare
tire? Stock markets, banking crises, and economic recoveries, 120 Journal of Financial Economics 81
(2016).
5

5

Part I: Some Introductory Evidence on US v. EU differences
The fact of significant differences between capital markets in the US and the EU is not
news, but a graphical display of some of the differences, over time, is nevertheless revealing.
Figure 1, drawn from the Goldsmith data over the 1850-1978 period, charts the “securities to
loan ratio” for the US vs. Europe. (The US line is the top line throughout most of the period.)
This ratio divides the sum of private debt securities and equity by bank loans. The ratio is
narrowing by the end of the period but still significant.
Figure 1

Source: Raymond Goldsmith, COMPARATIVE NATIONAL BALANCE SHEETS: A STUDY OF TWENTY
COUNTRIES, 1688-1978.

Three comparative measures nicely capture the differences between the US and the EU
and how each evolved over time. The first is a comparative measure of equity-funding in capital
formation. Here the US and the EU are relatively similar, over a period that goes up to 2000.
Indeed, the equity to GNP ratio for the US and European countries is very similar.

6

Figure 2

The “fraction of gross fixed-capital formation raised via equity” is the amount
of fund raised through initial public offerings and seasoned equity issuances by
domestic corporations divided by gross fixed-capital formation (a loose proxy
for the total investments of domestic corporations).
Source: Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales, THE GREAT REVERSALS: THE POLITICS OF
FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (2003).

The differences show up in the fraction of debt that is financed through bank loans vs.
securities markets. The figures below, drawn from the Goldsmith data (which seems to be the
most current for comparable data) chart comparatively US vs. EU, bank loans to GNP and debt
securities to GNP, over the 1850-1978 period. A gap opens up beginning before the turn of the
century. Bank loans to GNP increase at a much lower rate in the US than in the EU. [Figure 3].
By contrast, debt securities to GNP escalates in the US [Figure 4] in part because of the
explosion of debt securities issuance in the US to finance the railroads and enterprises that are
reaching for national scale, as described below.

7

Figure 3

Figure 4

Source for Figs. 3 and 4: Raymond Goldsmith, COMPARATIVE NATIONAL BALANCE SHEETS: A
STUDY OF TWENTY COUNTRIES, 1688-1978.

8

Part II: The Fragmented US Banking System
The banking history of the United States is distinctive and so the story should begin there.
From the Founding, the US has been locked in a battle over the appropriate structure of its
banking system, a debate on two distinct axes of state vs. federal power and concentrated vs.
small banking institutions.6 The US also followed the UK model of seeking to separate banking
from commerce. Although this barrier has always been imperfect, even its permeable form
prevented banks from exercising the kind of control rights commonly enjoyed by their European
counterparts.
The first Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton, successfully promoted a Bank
of the United States (explicitly modeled on the Bank of England), a private bank with public
functions. In light of concerns about Congress’ constitutional authority to charter such a bank
and disagreement over the centralization of banking activities, the Bank was chartered for a
limited term, 20 years (1791-1811). Although the Bank successfully fostered economic
development and monetary stability, the rechartering legislation failed, in part because of the
opposition of state-chartered bankers seeking to eliminate a federal competitor.7
A general banking panic in the midst of the War of 1812 with the British (in which
Washington, DC was burned) led to a push for the chartering of the Second Bank of the US, for a
twenty year term, 1816-1836. As the twenty year term approached its end, leading the
opposition was President Andrew Jackson, who vetoed rechartering legislation. His veto
message sounded populist themes that typify the concerns that have long shaped and impeded the
development of the US financial system: the Bank was a monopoly that exploited ordinary
citizens in favor of its shareholders, who were either foreigners or the rich; such a Bank was
beyond Congress’ constitutional powers and was inconsistent with the protection of states’
rights; the financial distress that might come with its unwinding was not a reason for its
perpetuation. The core of his populist message was: “Many of our rich men have not been
content with equal protection and equal benefits, but have besought us to make them richer by
act of Congress.” The end of the Second Bank of the US ushered in what is known as the “Free
Banking Era,” in which entrepreneurs were generally free to charter banks under state law, the
period 1836-1863.
A distinctive feature of the US story is the role of the states. At times over the 1789-1863
period, states limited the chartering of banks to protect local market power, either because the
state was a major stockholder in a bank or because of rent-seeking by local elites. Later in this
period, the free-banking era, states insisted that banknote issuances required the backing of state
bonds; i.e., that as a condition for operation, the banks had to help finance the state’s public debt.
Although a particular bank’s notes might circulate throughout the country (subject to a discount
based on an assessment of redeemability), the US Supreme Court sustained state efforts to limit
the activities of out-of-state banks if explicitly prescribed in state legislation.

6

For a useful short history from which this account is drawn see Richard Scott Carnell, Jonathan R.
Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, THE LAW OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (2013), ch. 1; Charles W. Calomiris
& Stephen H. Haber, FRAGILE BY DESIGN, ch. 6 (“Crippled by Populism: U.S. Banking from Colonial
Times to 1990). See also the sources cited in note 4 supra.
7
The competition was not just in commercial lending but in the issuance of bank notes, which functioned
as currency. The state-chartered banks wanted more of the seigniorage.
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The most important part of the US story is “unit banking,” meaning a bank that could
operate out of only one location. Even in states that permitted banks to open additional branches,
branching was limited and under-developed. This unit banking/limited branching structure arose
from state level decision-making, but it persisted even after the National Bank Act of 1863,
which permitted the chartering of national banks. National banks were made subject to the
restrictions on branching in the state in which they were chartered. The political economy
focused on the interests of local elites in protecting rents from their banks and the general
populist sentiment against the concentration of bank power.
The consequence was a highly fragmented and decentralized banking system.8 Although
some liberalization of state and federal branching rule occurred in the 1970s and 1980s, it wasn’t
until the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 that the barriers
to interstate branching were comprehensively eliminated.9 This triggered rapid consolidation in
US banking. The relatively high concentration of US banking assets among the “G-SIBs” as of
the time of the financial crisis of 2007-09 is thus a quite late addition to US financial
development.
The original fragmentation of the US banking system and the dramatic rise in
concentration following Riegle-Neal are illustrated by three figures showing the degree of
concentration in the largest firms.10 The progression goes from highly concentrated in the
immediate post-independence period (when there were a handful of banks) to negligible
concentration throughout the 19th century into the 20th century as the number of banks
proliferates.11 Then, relaxation of the interstate branch-banking constraints leads to successive
bank merger waves and much higher concentration, rapidly accelerating in the 2000s. Crisis-era

8

For more on this history, see Charles W. Calomiris & Stephen H. Haber, FRAGILE BY DESIGN: THE
POLITICAL ORIGINS OF BANKING CRISES AND SCARCE CREDIT, ch. 6 (2014).
9
Among the drivers for interstate banking was the advent of the ATM, which opened the way to
nationwide deposit gathering, and the banking crises of the 1980s, which underscored the fragility of
undiversified unit banks.
10
A “5-firm concentration ratio” is the ratio of the assets/deposits of the 5 largest banks relative to total
assets/deposits in the system. The figure on the historical ratio is found in Caroline Fohlin & Matthew
Jaremski, Bank Concentration in the United States, 1800-1914 (Dec. 2015) (fig. 1). The figure showing
the modern ratio was generated by the FRED system of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis based on
the World Bank’s GFD data.
11
This table, from Carnell et al, p. 13, shows the steady increase in the number of banks, which produces
the low concentration ratios. The number of banks peaked at more than 30,000, shortly before the
Depression, which over a five year period of closing and consolidation halved the number of banks. US
Department of Commerce, Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, Washington
D.C.
Year
1865
1880
1890
1900
1914

Number of Banks
1643
2696
5585
8100
22,030
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mergers accentuated this trend, and the trend has now continued as a result of organic growth
following the crisis.12
Figure 5

12

Rachel Louise Ensign, Biggest Three Banks Gobble Up $2.4 Trillion in New Deposits Since Crisis,
Wall. St. J., March 22, 1918.
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Figure 6

A “three firm” concentration ratio dating back to 1935 shows once again the recency of
concentration in the US banking system and underscores the long-standing prior fragmentation.

Figure 7

https://www.ft.com/content/f2e4dbb0-4caa-11df-9977-00144feab49a
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Part III: The Rise of the Railroads and Large Industrial Companies: the Financing
Mismatch between Fragmented Banking and Concentrated Enterprise
The American hostility to large banks meant that until quite recently (the 1990s)
individual banks were relatively small, even “Money Center” banks. Until the early 20th century,
the US also lacked a central bank. Such fragmentation meant that large scale single bank loans
were not feasible, which thus favored conditions for the development of market-based debt
finance.13 Debt finance for large scale enterprises would require loan syndication, formal or
informal; this in turn entailed significant transaction costs. Indeed, part of the populist political
economy disfavored out-of-state lending. “In the antebellum decades, a number of states actually
passed laws prohibiting bank loans to persons living in other states.”14 By contrast, bond
issuance could take advantage of regional, and even national and international, distribution
networks to access national credit pools. Moreover, in the absence of a lender of last resort, US
banks were disadvantaged as providers of long term credit because of the run risk. Credit
intermediation through markets could mitigate such problems.15
At the same time that banks were proliferating and the banking system was fragmenting,
industrial firms were concentrating. Precisely because the US was constituted as a “single
market” in goods and services (fortified by the Commerce Clause in this regard), firms could
grow to regional and then national scale to take advantage of scale and scope economies. This
led to capital structures that “demanded” national scale to sustain.16
The first example was the railroads, the paradigm large industrial firms of the 19th
century. Railroad development took place in successive waves beginning in the 1820s.17 The
level of investment in construction and equipment (measured in 1909 dollars) rapidly escalated
13

Charles Calomiris also observes the ramifications of limiting US bank capacity during this period, but
his focus is on the way that the US decision not to allow universal banking increased the cost of financial
intermediation across channels. Charles Calomiris, The Costs of Rejecting Universal Banking: American
Finance in the German Mirror, 1870-1914, in THE COORDINATION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY WITHIN AND
BETWEEN FIRMS, at 257 (Naomi Lamoreaux & Daniel Raff, eds., 1995).
14
Lance E. Davis, The Investment Market, 1870-1914, 25(3) Journal of Economic History 355 (1969), at
372 (with sources).
15
In the interest of space, this chapter does not address the distinct and important role of private
placements of debt in facilitating the growth of market-based finance in the United States, particularly in
the 1940s. Charles Calomiris & Daniel Raff, The Evolution of Market Structure, Information, and
Spreads in American Investment Banking, in ANGLO-AMERICAN FINANCE: FINANCIAL MARKETS AND
INSTITUTIONS IN 20TH-CENTURY NORTH AMERICA AND THE U.K., at 103 (Richard Sylla & Michael
Bordo, eds., 1995).
16
Lamoreaux describes the legal and other barriers to bank mergers (including the resistance of
incumbent bank managers) that might have produced banks of such larger scale. Naomi R. Lamoreaux,
Bank Mergers in Late Nineteenth Century New England: The Contingent Nature of Structural Change,
51(3) Journal of Economic History 537 (1991).
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Some of the detail in this account is drawn from the CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES, Vol. II, (Stanley L. Engerman & Robert E. Gallman, eds., 2000), especially chapters by Albert
Fishlow, Internal Transportation in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century; Lance E. Davis &
Robert J. Cull, International Capital Movements, Domestic Capital Markets, and American Economic
Growth, 1820-1914; and Stanley L. Engerman & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, Technology and Industrialization,
1790-1914; and also Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., Patterns of American Railroad Finance, 1830-50, 28(3)
Business History Review 248 (1954).
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in successive decades from approximately $89 million (1828-38), to $927 million (1849-58), to
$2 billion (1870-79), to $4.1 billion (1880-89), cresting at $5 billion (1900-09). Most of the
finance was in bonds, and a substantial fraction, perhaps a third, came from foreign investors.
Early in the period, state and local municipal bonds played an important role.
Indeed, the level of railroad finance, especially later in the period, suggests a separate,
complementary theory to the growth of the US capital market union. The railroads may have
been too risky to finance with bank loans. The high fixed costs and the potential for rate wars
meant frequent defaults and frequent railroad reorganizations in which bondholders faced
significant haircuts. The high rate of interest in light of these risks was part of the appeal to
foreign investors, especially in the UK, the source of most of the foreign investment. In other
words, the railroads issued the original “junk bonds.”18 No US bank at the time was large
enough to diversify such risks in its loan portfolio. Especially in the absence of a lender of last
resort, the presence of such risky loans on the balance sheet would unacceptably increase the run
risks.
In sum, the fragmented, populist structure of the US banking system gave rise to three
separate supply-limitations on railroad finance: The first was the “costly transacting” problem, in
which the costs of organizing a large enough syndicate of small banks to provide and then
monitor a large-scale loan would have been prohibitive. The second was the “junk debt”
problem, in which the risky nature of railroad lending would have required either extreme
diversification (extra-costly transacting in a fragmented system) or a substantial increase in
capital to avoid a risk to bank solvency from a railroad default. The third was the “run risk”
problem in the absence of a lender of last resort. The riskiness of railroad debt (reflected in
frequent defaults) could easily produce panic runs against the lending banks, because in the
absence of a LOLR they would be unable to borrow against the railroad debt on their balance
sheets.
The inability of the banking system to support the burgeoning debt financing needs of
railway expansion in the US was the imperative for the development of an alternative supply side
channel in light of the intense demand for finance. Investment bankers of the time arranged for
bond issuances that could funnel in financial resources from a national and international
catchment area.19 Eventually the issuance and trading of bonds became centered into a single
venue, a national market “centralized and institutionalized” in New York City.20 The use of
national markets rather than local institutions to intermediate debt gave rise to a “capital market
union.” The demand for trading in railroad bond and equity issuances is also part of the rise of
what became the dominant stock exchange, the New York Stock Exchange.21 One would be
18

Snowden reports that the average annual nominal total return on railroad bonds was notably higher for
the 1872-1899 period (6.87 percent) than for the 1900-1925 period (4.06 percent). Kenneth A. Snowden,
Historical Returns and Security Market Development, 1872-1925, 27 Explorations in Economic History
381, 387, 389 (1990).
19
For a thorough history of the rise of investment banks, their evolving role in shaping and maintaining
the capital market channel, and theory supporting the same, see Alan D. Morrison & William J. Wilhelm
Jr., INVESTMENT BANKING: INSTITUTIONS, POLITICS, AND THE LAW (2008).
20
See Alfred Chandler, THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS
91-92 (1977).
21
See Mary O’Sullivan, The Expansion of the U.S. Stock Market, 1885-1930: Historical Facts and
Theoretical Foundations, 8(3) Enterprise & Society 489 (2007) (“122 out of the 151 stocks traded on the
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remiss to discuss any of these developments without acknowledging the role played by a key
financial system entrepreneur, J.P. Morgan, who facilitated the placement of railroad debt,
brought about railroad consolidation to reduce the riskiness of that debt, repeated these patterns
in other industries, and aided the design changes that enhanced the credibility of securities traded
on the NYSE.22
The railroads dramatically reduced transportation costs, which in turn transformed the
scale economies of production and distribution. This promoted the creation of regional and then
national industrial companies, often achieved by roll-ups of smaller firms through holding
company transactions and later mergers in which stock was the consideration.23 The “demand
side” for capital market union in the US came from the transformation of the US economy from
one characterized chiefly by local manufacturers producing for local markets to one of national
manufacturers producing for a national market. The canonical account is provided by Alfred D.
Chandler: After the Civil War, "new methods of transportation and communication, by
permitting a large and steady flow of raw materials into and finished products out of a factory,
made possible unprecedented levels of production. The realization of this potential required,
however, the invention of new machinery and processes." These forces led in turn to sharp
increases in optimal plant size because they gave large plants substantial cost advantages over
smaller ones and to larger enterprises both to pursue the emerging technologies and also as a
result of the accompanying industrial consolidation.
These developments produced a demand for debt markets that could reliably supply large
scale long-term debt finance. Indeed the mismatch between firm size and US bank fragmentation
may have been a persistent feature contributing to a US bond market consistently larger than
Europe’s and a bank lending market consistently smaller, measuring both as a fraction of GNP,
per Figures 3 and 4 above. These developments also produced the demand for equity markets
that could provide an avenue for fund-raising, through preferred stock issuance as well as
common, but also, importantly, to provide liquidity for the shareholders who had received stock
in the industry-consolidating roll-ups.24

NYSE in 1885 were railroad stocks"). O’Sullivan and Richard Sylla, Schumpeter Redux, 44 Journal of
Economic Literature 401 (2006) have shown that the US equity markets in the early 20th century were at
least as large as European comparators, contrary to Raghuram C. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, SAVING
CAPITALISM FROM THE CAPITALISTS (2003) and The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial
Development in the Twentieth Century, 69 Journal of Financial Economics 5 (2003). The distinctive
element for the United States was the way that banking fragmentation led to a national market in debt
securities.
22
Vincent P. Carosso, THE MORGANS: PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL BANKERS, 1854–1913 (1987); Carlos
D. Ramirez, Did J. P. Morgan's Men Add Liquidity? Corporate Investment, Cash Flow, and Financial
Structure at the Turn of the Twentieth Century 50(2) Journal of Finance 661 (1995); Thomas K. McCraw,
Thinking About Competition, 17 Business and Economic History 9 (1988).
23
See Brian R. Cheffins, Mergers and Corporate Ownership Structure: The United States and Germany at
the Turn of the 20th Century, 51 American Journal of Comparative Law 473 (2003); Brian R. Cheffins &
Steven Bank, Is Berle and Means Really a Myth? 83 Business History Review 443, 449-450 (2009).
24
Thomas R. Navin & Marian Sears, The Rise of a Market for Industrial Securities, 1887-1902, 29(2)
Business History Review 105 (1955); Cheffins, and Cheffins & Bank, note 23 supra. Alfred D. Chandler,
Jr., SCALE AND SCOPE: THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM, ch. 2 (1990).
From this perspective, the historiography that asks whether bank financial capacity precedes enterprise
(or vice versa) misses the possible development of market-based finance (and financial institutions) that
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The “law and finance” scholarship has told a story that implicitly assumes that capital
market development is an add-on to bank finance, framed principally in terms of an equity
channel. The focus on “investor protection” is a “tell” that public equity issuance is the main
object of analysis. A closer look at the US story reveals the importance of public debt markets in
capital market development. Public debt issuance to finance the railroads and industrial firms
created the distribution channels; equity issuances followed. Indeed, the first regulatory
protections in the early 20th century seem to be aimed at speculative and fraudulent debt as much,
if not more, than equity.25
Part IV. Law Mattered to the US Capital Market Union
The prior two sections have argued that the origins of the US CMU are to be found in the
clash between a longstanding feature of US political economy, suspicion of large financial
institutions, and the funding needs of large scale enterprise. That might have been sufficient to
get the capital market going, but a set of New Deal-era laws were critical to its further
development. These not only provided better investor protection (the 1933 and 1934 securities
acts), 26 but they also created structural conditions for further development of the US CMU. This
Part discusses two particular instances of law-making that played critical roles. The first was the
adoption of the Glass-Steagall Act, which separated commercial from investment banking. The
second was the establishment of the SEC and the creation of an extensive structure of federal
regulation, which suppressed what otherwise would have become increasingly potent state
efforts to regulate securities markets. Thus, the law that mattered to the development and
maintenance of a Capital Market Union in the US was not just investor protection law, the usual
account of the 1930s “sec-reg” legislation, but “financial structure” law: law that set up the
relevant set of competitive institutions and that tamped down the power of local regulatory
authorities, which would be inclined to focus on local rather than national interests.
A. Glass-Steagall. The National Bank Act of 1863 articulated a regime of limited
powers for a national bank, so as to keep it focused on the “business of banking.” By historical
tradition and law, US banks did not underwrite corporate securities and generally limited their
holdings of debt securities to commercial paper. As securities markets became more robust,
banks wanted to participate in securities markets activities, especially underwriting. This activity
was generally pursued through an affiliate of the bank rather than the bank directly, both for

requires less expensive infrastructure for establishment and expansion. Compare, e.g., Howard
Bodenhorn, A HISTORY OF BANKING IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA ch. 1 (2000).
25
See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 Texas Law Review 347,
352-359 (1991) (“speculative securities” were commonly bonds); id, at 359-77 & n. 137 (political
economy of Blue Sky Laws; the Investment Bankers Association formed to resist Blue Sky Laws was
composed of bond dealers).
26
On the initial rise of US capital markets despite robust investor protection law, see John C. Coffee,
Dispersed Ownership: The Theories, the Evidence, and the Enduring Tension Between “Lumpers” and
“Spitters,” in Dennis C. Mueller, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CAPITALISM (2012), available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1532922; John C. Coffee, , The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Role of Law
and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 Yale L. J. 1 (2001); Mary O’Sullivan, The
Expansion of the U.S. Stock Market, 1885-1930: Historical Facts and Theoretical Foundations, 8(3)
Enterprise & Society 489 (2007).
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legal and reputation-protecting grounds.27 In the wake of the Great Depression, various reformers
concluded that securities activities by these affiliates in league with the bank itself had been a
major contributor to the debacle. (Modern day economists are skeptical of that conclusion.) Part
of the reform program was the Glass-Steagall Act, which forbad affiliation between securities
firms and banks, taking banks out of the business of underwriting debt or equity securities for
private firms, and trading securities for its own account.
As Gordon has elsewhere argued, Glass-Steagall insisted on free-standing investment
banks, which could make their success only through securities markets, not through commercial
banking. These investment banks quickly learned credit markets were more profitable than
equity markets. Firms issue equity only infrequently but are constantly in need of credit, if only
to roll over maturing indebtedness. Thus investment banks were powerfully incentivized to
develop market-based mechanisms of credit intermediation, which became effective substitutes
for bank-based credit. Because investment banks were blocked from conventional commercial
banking, they had strong incentives to achieve functionally equivalent credit-provision and to
pursue cost advantages relentlessly. By contrast, as European finance demonstrates, a universal
bank with a strong commercial lending franchise would be reluctant to cannibalize its existing
franchise by developing market-based alternatives.28 Moreover, such universal banks would
have strong incentives to protect their existing franchise by resisting the entry of banking
institutions that might specialize in market-based finance.29 Glass-Steagall cut off that path for
US banks.
The arrival of free-standing investment banks interacted with post-World War II
decisions in the US that both privatized retirement provisioning (beyond the social security
baseline) and that led to pre-funding of such retirement obligations both by state/local
governments as well as private industry. 30 Particularly by the 1950s and 1960s, this fostered the
creation of deep capital pools that could fund credit issuances as well as equity.31 Glass-Steagall
had given the investment banks pole-position in deploying these funds. The national reach of the
investment banks, including extensive national branching that facilitated retail securities
distribution, furthered the development of a capital market union in the US.
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29
Compare, e.g., Raghuram C. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial
Development in the Twentieth Century, 69 Journal of Financial Economics 5 (2003).
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B. A National Regulation and a National Regulator. Another critical element of the
New Deal-era regulatory scheme was the suppression of state securities regulation. Central to
this development was the creation of a federal securities regulator, the Securities and Exchange
Commission, which had a mandate to establish an extensive disclosure system for both initial
public offerings and the firm’s on-going financial results. The SEC was also vested with an
enforcement mandate to protect markets from fraud. More broadly, the sweeping adoption of
national regulatory systems in the 1930s and 1940 in the US locked into place a “national” focus
for the capital markets that were then developing and under-regulated. This national focus was
an essential element in the US CMU.
Before the New Deal legislation, the states had begun to regulate securities activity, the
so-called “blue sky laws.” Beginning with the first adoption by Kansas in 1911, by 1931 all but
one of the 48 states had adopted a blue sky law. There were two general types, ones that required
pre-clearance, either on a “merit” review or a less-stringent “no fraud” test, and others that were
aimed at ex post fraud. Roughly three-quarters of the states required pre-clearance, though the
most stringent review was in the minority.32 The 1933 Securities Act and the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act each preserved the “jurisdiction” of state securities commissions and did not
evince the desire totally to occupy the field of securities regulation, which might have produced
“pre-emption” of state activity.33 Why, in the aftermath of the Depression, did states not act
more vigorously in the regulatory space? Certainly one reason was the vigor of the SEC, which
under the guidance of energetic and knowledgeable leaders, rapidly promulgated extensive
disclosure requirements and undertook enforcement actions.34 The national law-making process
that culminated in the New Deal securities regulation and the infusion of personnel and funding
into the SEC largely froze state regulatory efforts in place.
Various actors recognized the need for federal-state coordination; these efforts were
organized through a pre-existing quasi-official body that worked to promote coordination among
disparate state regimes, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.35
Eventually these efforts culminated in the Uniform Securities Act of 1956, enabling most large
corporate issuers to use their federal filings to satisfy state requirements. Nevertheless
significant disparity has persisted among the different state schemes for smaller issuers, leading
to ongoing efforts to widen federal pre-emption of state pre-clearance regimes.36 The point is
that a well-funded national regulator wielding broad authority to impose disclosure standards and
to regulate securities markets suppressed what otherwise would have been strong regulatory
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See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 Texas Law Review 347
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impulses at the state level and in that way has helped to foster and sustain a US Capital Market
Union.
Part V – Conclusion
Are there generalizations from this peculiarly American story? One takeaway is that
where a banking system labors under constraints, a capital market channel can robustly support
the flow of finance to large-scale enterprise in the real economy. For a certain segment of the
financing spectrum, banks and capital markets can be substitutes. This is consistent with the EU
experience of strong banks and relatively weak capital markets. A major barrier in the US to
bank finance of national-scale enterprise was a state-based banking system. Capital markets
institutions and channels, which are not so heavily reliant on support from the state, can funnel
funds around such a barrier. This obvious analogy is a major reason why CMU is so promising
and urgent for economic integration in the EU.
Separately, it may be that one reason US banks recovered more quickly from the crisis is
that the alternative credit market channels provided a route for selling off troubled assets at a
manageable discount. The availability of such channels may empower EU supervisors to insist
on such strategies from troubled banks in the EU.
Other key issues are institutional competence, both public and private, and uniformity
across Member States. The US experience highlights how a powerful federal regulator can help
suppress costly diversity by instituting a credible disclosure and enforcement regime and by
aiding evolution in the law in the face of new challenges and opportunities. One challenge for
the EU is to find its own pattern of federal regulation over the EU’s capital market that will
facilitate EU-wide issuance of debt and equity securities. This is less a problem of the financial
institutional architecture than the regulatory architecture. With MiFID II, the European Securities
and Markets Authority has been forging ahead in ways that may well lay the groundwork for
further harmonization and coordination. Elements of MiFID II, most notably the requirement
that research services be charged separately from brokerage services, also suggest that the
relatively weaker EU CMU may enable the EU to leapfrog over the US in areas where
entrenched interests may be impeding the efficiency of the US regime.37 Nonetheless,
substantial challenges remain. A main source of resistance will be “regulatory embeddedness”
among the Member States and the notable forces of path-dependency, both the short-term
efficiency-based as well as the protectionist rent-based.
Another approach for the EU is on the “supply” side. The US experience illuminates the
importance of private actors who stand to gain from producing robust capital markets. The
increasing wealth of EU citizens and the flow into retirement savings is creating capital pools
that can, with appropriate facilitation, flow through securities markets for investment throughout
the EU. The key actors are asset managers (which include for these purposes the insurers and the
pension funds) to fund the supply side. Asset managers can screen potential borrowers and
assemble diversified portfolios of credit claims without the aid of banks. Institutions like asset
37
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managers may also be particularly important in the EU where language differences may impede
cross-border capital flows in ways the US never had to confront.
The systemic stability concerns that are among the reasons for the CMU also argue for
permitting the growth of asset managers. Asset managers generally do not engage in a high level
of liquidity transformation, making them inherently less fragile than banks. Robust capital
markets have also long been viewed as potentially enhancing financial system resilience by
serving as an alternative source of credit when banking systems face periodic distress. With due
regard for systemic stability and the protection of a beneficiary’s claims in the case of insurers
and pension funds, regulation that permits use of these funds for market-based credit
intermediation is a critical element for CMU in the EU. Thus attention should turn to various
Directives with this objective in mind, including the Alternative Investment Fund Management
Directive, the Solvency II Directive for insurers, and Directive on Institutions for Occupational
Retirement Provision. With a sufficiently broad view of the range of actions that may be
necessary to cultivate the conditions for a thriving CMU, the EU has the opportunity to write the
next chapter in the role of law and regulatory architecture in shaping financial market structure.
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